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Introduction 
 
 
Most people use language constantly, and are able to understand and generate 
expressions with little to no conscious thought.  Because of this, people do not often question 
what it is that their expressions actually mean and how they come to know this – they just know 
what the expressions mean, and that is all they need to get by in the world.  Philosophers, 
however, being the particularly inquisitive bunch that they are, are not so easily satisfied.  Thus 
over the years, philosophers have inquired into the realm of meaning, formulating various 
theories of how to specify the meaning of expressions. 
A common approach to developing a meaning theory (a theory that specifies the meaning 
of any expression of a given language)1 is to suggest that the meanings of expressions are 
contained in entities called “propositions,” which are connected to their corresponding 
expressions by some relation of reference.  Other philosophers, however, have taken issue with 
the “meanings as entities” approach, and have reacted against it by devising their own theories 
that do not employ such a conception of meaning.  Among the most prominent of these 
philosophers is Donald Davidson.  In several individual articles, Davidson advances a non-
propositionalist account of the meanings of expressions, revolving around his famous suggestion 
that a properly constrained Tarski-style truth theory for a language can give us the meaning of 
expressions as well as their truth conditions. Davidson also develops an empirical method by 
which he argues we could construct such a truth theory.  This is the project known as “radical 
                                                 
1
 Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2005): 19-20.  Lepore and Ludwig distinguish the term “meaning theory” (as defined above) from 
a “theory of meaning,” which is a theory about the concept of meaning – what meaning is – and does not purport to 
be able to give the meanings of expressions in a particular language.  The present paper is concerned only with a 
meaning theory, not a theory of meaning. 
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interpretation.”  Taken together, these form a unified theory that purports to be able to give a 
procedure for specifying the meaning of any expression in any language – a meaning theory.  
Davidson’s united meaning theory is far-reaching, innovative, and complex.  As such, 
there are many controversial aspects, each of which could probably generate a book’s worth of 
discussion.  Confronting the question of radical interpretation’s success comprehensively is a 
task that would require a hefty volume (i.e. Lepore and Ludwig’s Donald Davidson: Meaning, 
Truth, Language, and Reality), and is quite beyond the reach of one paper.  However, once 
confronted with Davidson’s theory as a whole, the natural question for one to ask in response is, 
“okay, now, does it work?”  So, given the fact that I do not desire to write a book, I will 
approach the question of the success of radical interpretation by looking at one particular sub-
issue.   
My project is this: I will attempt to contribute to the evaluation of the success of 
Davidson’s radical interpretation by considering a particular issue that arises during radical 
interpretation that, if unsolved, could be fatal to its success.  This issue is sometimes referred to 
as “the ambiguity problem.”  The issue is that ambiguities that arise during the process of 
interpretation seem to indicate that the evidence available to the interpreter underdetermines any 
theory confirmed on the basis of this evidence.  If these ambiguities cannot be resolved, radical 
interpretation will be unsuccessful in producing a meaning theory for a language.  Davidson 
employs his triangulation thesis – the claim that speakers must be or have been in 
communication with other speakers in order to actually be speakers of a language (make 
meaningful utterances) – as a solution to these ambiguities.  My primary thesis is that the 
triangulation response provides a successful solution to the ambiguity problem.  I will argue for 
this first by presenting the triangulation view and the initial argument that it solves the problem 
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at hand, and then by defending it against certain objections that have been leveled against the 
view by some of Davidson’s readers.  As a consequence of arguing for this primary claim (that 
an appeal to triangulation solves the ambiguity problems), I am automatically arguing in support 
of a secondary claim: that radical interpretation is a successful.  Since the ambiguity problem 
was a threat to the success of radical interpretation, by arguing that it can be solved, I am adding 
to the case that radical interpretation is successful in producing a meaning theory for a given 
language. 
Clearly, a significant amount of groundwork needs to be done before I can get to directly 
arguing for my thesis.  The paper will proceed as follows: in order to give any sort of evaluation 
of Davidson’s theory, we first need to spell his theory out with an adequate degree of precision.  
Chapter 1 will cover the motivation for Davidson’s theory by describing his dissatisfaction with 
traditional “meanings as entities” approaches and his process for arriving at the suggestion that a 
properly constrained truth theory can also work as a meaning theory.  I will then attempt to give 
a clear characterization of how Davidson’s theory actually works in two parts, based on a helpful 
distinction between Davidson’s “initial” and “extended” projects from Lepore and Ludwig.  The 
first part aims to show how a truth theory can work as a part of a meaning theory.  The second 
part explains Davidson’s “radical interpretation,” which is his procedure for actually constructing 
a meaning theory based purely on the behavior of speakers. 
Once the theory under discussion has been clearly characterized, I will turn in Chapter 2 
to the ambiguity problem and the triangulation-based solution.  I will first give a brief description 
of underdetermination, which is necessary in order to understand the weight of the ambiguity 
problem.  I will then spell out the ambiguity problem itself, and explain why the ambiguity 
problem poses an issue for the success of radical interpretation.  Next I will explain what 
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Davidson’s triangulation thesis is, how he argues for it, and finally argue that triangulation solves 
the ambiguity problem. 
Finally, Chapter 3 seeks to defend triangulation against objections advanced by some 
critics of the view.  I will consider three objections to triangulation: one from Catherine 
Talmage, one derived from Quine’s “gavagai” example, and one from Lepore and Ludwig.  In 
this chapter, I will present these three objections to triangulation, and offer my own responses to 
each objection in turn.  By doing so, I hope to add support to the claim that triangulation solves 
the ambiguity problem.
 8 
Chapter 1 
 
Davidson’s Meaning Theory 
 
1.1 The Compositionality Constraint and the Inutility of Meanings-as-Entities 
 Davidson begins his investigation into meaning by thinking about what form a meaning 
theory must take in order to be adequate.  Davidson’s first proposal is that a meaning theory must 
exhibit meaning to be compositional – that is, it must show how the meanings of complex 
expressions depend on the meanings of their parts.  This was not a new idea; as Davidson says in 
the beginning of his article “Truth and Meaning,” many philosophers of language at the time, as 
well as some linguists, had come to this conclusion as well.2  However, since this 
compositionality constraint is at the very foundation of the theory Davidson develops, it is 
important to look at why one might suppose a meaning theory needs to exhibit the 
compositionality of meaning in order to be adequate. 
 The argument for the compositionality constraint is based on the learnability of language.  
Meaning must, Davidson argues, be compositional, because if it were not, it would be impossible 
to learn a language.  Natural languages contain an infinite number of nonsynonymous 
expressions.  To know a language is to be able to understand any expression of that language.3  
                                                 
2
 Donald Davidson, “Truth and Meaning,” Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984): 
17. 
3
 This statement is probably too strong.  Taken at face value, it implies that if one does not know every single word 
of the English language, one cannot know English.  This would likely result in no person actually knowing English, 
which is not a desirable conclusion (I encounter a number of people everyday who I would say know English).  
However, this might be resolved by realizing that knowing a language is not an exclusive “either you know it or you 
don’t” situation.  Rather knowing a language might be conceived of as on a continuum, with more and less 
competent speakers.  We might then say that one knows a language when one has reached a certain level of 
competency – when one is in a position to be able to understand the vast majority of expressions in that language, or 
something of that sort. 
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And for Davidson, to understand an expression is to be able to specify what it means.4  So, to 
know a language is to be able to specify what any expression5 in a language means.  Therefore, if 
meaning were not compositional, each expression would have to be learned individually in order 
to know a language.  Since there are infinite expressions, assuming each expression takes a finite 
amount of time to be learned, learning a language would take an infinite amount of time.  
Therefore, language would be unlearnable, since humans have finite life spans.  However, since 
we know that humans do learn languages, it must be the case that meaning is compositional – 
languages consist in a finite number of basic expressions and a finite set of rules, by which one is 
able to understand an infinite number of nonsynonymous expressions.6 
 From this reasoning, Davidson concludes that any proposed meaning theory that does not 
demonstrate compositionality – does not show how the meanings of complex expressions are 
based on the meanings of their atomic parts – has failed to explicate something essential to how 
meaning operates, and is thus inadequate.7  We have thus established the compositionality 
constraint.  After establishing the necessity of this constraint on a meaning theory, Davidson’s 
research question becomes: how exactly does one give such a compositional account of 
meaning?8  What sort of theory will do the trick? 
 Davidson devotes a fair amount of time to addressing a certain approach to giving a 
meaning theory that was quite popular at the time he was doing his work.  The idea of this 
approach is that “meanings” of expressions are things, or entities, to which expressions somehow 
                                                 
4
 Lepore and Ludwig, Donald Davidson, 26. 
5
 Or perhaps the vast majority of expressions, if we go with the “competency” interpretation of knowing a language 
sketched above in Chapter 1, footnote 2. 
6
 This argument is taken both from Davidson’s own presentation in Donald Davidson, “Theories of Meaning and 
Learnable Languages,” Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984): 8-9, and a more 
formalized presentation in Lepore and Ludwig, Donald Davidson, 28. 
7
 Davidson, “Theories of Meaning,” 3. 
8
 Davidson, “Truth and Meaning,” 17. 
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refer.9  Davidson strongly objects to this approach, and this objection provides the impetus 
behind his suggestion that a truth-theory could also serve as a meaning theory, if properly 
constrained.  
 Davidson’s main objection to the meanings-as-entities approach is that they lack utility in 
constructing a compositional meaning theory.  To demonstrate this, Davidson asks us to consider 
the expression “the father of Annette.”10  Presumably the meaning of this expression is simply 
the father of Annette.  Can using the meanings-as-entities approach lead us to this conclusion?  
The meanings-as-entities approach would go about answering this question by first assigning 
some meaning to each of the parts of the expression – in this case, “the father of,” and “Annette.”  
Suppose for this example that we have assigned Annette as the meaning of “Annette.”  Finding 
the entity to assign to “the father of” is a bit trickier, however, as Davidson notes, “the answer 
would seem to be that the meaning of ‘the father of’ is such that when this expression is prefixed 
to a singular term the result refers to the father of the person to whom the singular term refers.”11  
That is to say, the meaning of “the father of,” according to this approach, would be a function 
that maps people to their fathers.12 
 So, when asked what the expression “the father of Annette” means, the meanings-as-
entities approach gives us that the meaning of “the father of Annette” is some concatenation of a 
function which maps persons to their fathers, and Annette.13  It may seem like this does the trick, 
but Lepore and Ludwig make the perceptive observation that the approach does not succeed.14  
What we were looking for was a way to understand the expression “the father of Annette” based 
                                                 
9
 Lepore and Ludwig, Donald Davidson, 39. 
10
 Davidson, “Truth and Meaning,” 17. 
11
 Ibid., 18. 
12
 Lepore and Ludwig, Donald Davidson, 46. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. 
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on the meanings of its parts (since the theory must be compositional, as above shown), which are 
a function that maps people to their fathers, and Annette.  This is not enough, however, to 
understand that “the father of Annette” means the father of Annette (which is our goal).  Based 
solely on the meanings of the parts, we are given no instructions that Annette is the person who 
ought to be plugged into the father function to yield the father of Annette.  Given only the 
meanings, we have no reason to plug Annette into the father function over any other person.15 
 Davidson now provides an alternative approach to this example.16  Suppose we construct 
a mini-theory for dealing with the expression “the father of Annette.”  Our mini-theory has two 
axioms: (1) “Annette” means Annette, and (2) “the father of,” when prefixed to a singular 
referring term x, means the father of x.  Now, when asked for the meaning of “the father of 
Annette,” we can say by axiom (2) that the expression means the father of “Annette,” and then 
by axiom (1) conclude that its meaning is the father of Annette.  Davidson’s point here is that no 
meaning-entity is or needs to be assigned to “the father of” in this account.17  It is a fine 
distinction.  Put another way, the difference between the two approaches is this: the first 
approach, the meanings-as-entities approach, has “the father of” mean the function that maps 
people to their fathers itself (a general statement, without respect to a specified input), while 
Davidson’s approach has “the father of” mean the operation of this function with respect to a 
specified input.  The key difference is that in the former approach, we do not have enough 
information to actually carry out the function – since we are referring to the function itself we 
                                                 
15
 One might challenge this interpretation (as suggested to me by Dr. Erica Stonestreet) by suggesting that the 
division of “the father of Annette” into only two parts (“the father of” and “Annette”) as opposed to three (“the 
father,” “of,” and “Annette”) is arbitrary.  The suggestion is that perhaps treating “of” as its own part, with its own 
independent meaning, is what connects Annette up with the function mapping people to their fathers.  However, 
now the question becomes what is the meaning of “the father”?  It no longer seems to be a function mapping people 
to their fathers.  I am not sure what the answer to this is, but my inkling is that since treating “of” as its own part 
results in the ambiguous part “the father,” this move does more harm than good for the meanings-as-entities view. 
16
 Davidson, “Truth and Meaning,” 18. 
17
 Ibid. 
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lack an input.  On the latter approach, we are not referring to the function itself, but rather the 
meaning of the expression is two rules: one that gives the function and the other that tells us what 
the input is.  This is crucial, because we need a theory that will be compositional, and only the 
latter (Davidson’s) approach is able to accomplish compositionality. 
 One might object here that Davidson is claiming the inutility of meanings as entities 
while making use of them at the same time – did not one of the axioms specify that the meaning 
of “Annette” was Annette, and is this not a meaning as an entity?  However, I think the answer to 
this lies in the fact that “Annette” is a proper noun – the function of the term is to name a thing 
(in this case, a person).  So it  is an important question.  Davidson follows up his own exposition 
of this example with the caveat that the “task was to give the meaning of all expressions in a 
certain infinite set on the basis of the meaning of the parts; it was not in the bargain also to give 
the meanings of the atomic parts.”18  It may seem at this point like this is a cop-out.  However, 
the answer will come shortly when we begin to discuss Davidson’s positive proposals in terms of 
Lepore and Ludwig’s “initial” and “extended” projects.  For the time being, Davidson’s only 
conclusion from this example is that it is possible to construct a theory giving the meaning of a 
complex expression (i.e. “the father of Annette”) without appealing to meanings as entities for 
all the parts of the expression.19  This will be acceptable when we consider the limited scope of 
the initial project.  Once we turn to the extended project, however, we will see how Davidson 
develops radical interpretation as a process that details how all the expressions of a language 
come to mean. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
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1.2 The Introduction of a Truth Theory 
 At this point, Davidson has made his arguments for the compositionality constraint on the 
form of an adequate meaning theory and against the utility of treating meanings as entities to 
which expressions refer.  We are now ready for Davidson’s positive proposals.  What Davidson 
is ultimately looking for is a theory that will yield theorems of the form  
(M) ‘s’ in L means that p. 
Where L is the language of study (the “object language”), ‘s’ is a structural description of an 
expression in L, and ‘p’ somehow gives the meaning of ‘s’ in the language of the theory (the 
“metalanguage”).  It is important to recall at this point that for Davidson, to give the meaning of 
an expression is simply to enable someone to understand the expression.  So whatever replaces 
‘p’ must be something that is sufficient to enable the understanding of ‘s’ by someone who does 
not speak L. 
 The present question is, then, how to go about performing this matching of ‘s’ in L with 
the appropriate ‘p’ in the metalanguage?  Recall that the appropriate ‘p’, as we have just said, is 
one that enables the understanding of ‘s’.  What Davidson proposes is this: we should get rid of 
the “means that” language for the time being, and instead provide a new predicate, T, that will 
apply to ‘s’ if an only if p.20  Formalized, the schema is this: 
(T) ‘s’ in L is T  if and only if p. 
We can then determine the appropriate ‘p’ for each ‘s’ by asking, if p, is ‘s’ T?  Vice-versa, we 
can determine the appropriate ‘s’ for each ‘p’ by asking, if ‘s’ is T, then p?  If the answer to both 
of these questions is “yes,” we have found an appropriate match, while if the answer to either is 
“no,” the match is inappropriate. 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., 23. 
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 What we need now is to determine what predicate ‘is T’ actually is.  It is immediately 
clear to Davidson that “the sentences to which the predicate ‘is T’ applies will be just the true 
sentences of L.”21  However, since not everyone is fortunate enough to be as intelligent as 
Donald Davidson, that ‘is T’ applies to only the true sentences of L may not be as immediately 
apparent to the rest of us.  So, this claim calls for a bit of exposition.  The idea is this: we know 
by schema (T) that if p, then ‘s’ is T.  So suppose p.  Then there is some corresponding ‘s’ in L 
that is T.  Can we say anything more specific about this ‘s’ besides that it exists and that it is T?  
Why yes, we can.  We know that ‘s’ must be true.  We supposed p, so p is true.  Then since the 
expression “‘s’ is T” is related to ‘p’ by a biconditional, “‘s’ is T” and ‘p’ must have the same 
truth-value.  So now we have that ‘s’ is T if and only if ‘s’ is true, thus establishing Davidson’s 
claim. 
 This seems to suggest that the predicate ‘is true’ is a strong candidate for ‘is T’ (which 
should not come a surprise to anyone who has encountered Tarski, as Davidson’s schema (T) 
bears a striking and intentional resemblance to Tarski’s Convention T).  Davidson gives us 
another reason to suppose that the predicate ‘is T’ is actually the predicate ‘is true.’  A definition 
of the predicate ‘is true’ taking the form of Tarski’s Convention T (‘s’ is true in L if and only if 
p) pairs each sentence of the object language with its truth conditions.  That is, it tells us what it 
is for any sentence in the object language to be true.  And this, Davidson suggests, amounts to 
understanding a language.22  And since specifying the truth conditions of an expression enable us 
to understand the expression, they also amount to specifying what the expression means. 
                                                 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid., 24. 
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 So we have finally arrived at Davidson’s first proposal: that “a theory of meaning23 for a 
language L shows ‘how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meanings of words’ if it 
contains a (recursive) definition of truth-in-L.”24  Our next step will be to see if this proposal 
pans out – does a recursive definition of truth-in-L actually succeed in specifying the meanings 
of complex expressions of a language based on the meanings of their parts?   
 
1.3 The Initial Project 
 One of Lepore and Ludwig’s most insightful interpretive claims about Davidson’s work 
on meaning is that Davidson actually ended up being engaged in two projects at once.  Davidson 
set out with the task of simply developing compositional meaning theory.  All the theory needed 
to do was show how the meanings of complex expressions depended on the meanings of their 
parts.  Davidson did not need to confront the issue of how these “parts” came to be meaningful 
as well in order to be successful at his original task.  This is what Lepore and Ludwig term 
Davidson’s “initial project.”25  They suggest, however, that confusion has arisen in interpretation 
of Davidson because Davidson got ahead of himself.  At some point in putting forth his proposal 
with regard to the initial project, Davidson must have seen how this same proposal could be 
extended to enable us to specify what all expressions of a language mean.  Davidson then began 
pursuing this project as well, which Lepore and Ludwig term the “extended project”26 without 
making it explicit that his aims had changed (perhaps Davidson himself was not fully conscious 
of the switch).  However, it is clear that at least at some point, all Davidson had in mind was 
                                                 
23
 The distinction between “theory of meaning” and “meaning theory” mentioned above was introduced by Lepore 
and Ludwig, and is not one that Davidson himself made.  To be consistent with the terminology of this paper, one 
should understand this as “meaning theory.” 
24
 Ibid., 23. 
25
 Lepore and Ludwig, Donald Davidson, 22. 
26
 Ibid. 
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providing the machinery of a compositional meaning theory, as evidenced when he states “the 
task was to give the meaning of all expressions in a certain infinite set on the basis of the 
meaning of the parts; it was not in the bargain also to give the meanings of the atomic parts.”27  
 At this point, we have already seen much of Davidson’s proposal with regard to the initial 
project – it is that a properly constrained truth-theory provides the machinery of a compositional 
meaning theory.  All we have left to do in service of the initial project is to show that this 
proposal actually works.  We will do this by first giving an example of a truth theory of the form 
in question for a much simplified version of French.  Then we will discuss what constraints 
needs to be applied to this truth theory in order to guarantee that we can infer from the theorems 
of the truth theory (‘s’ is true in L if and only if p) to theorems of a meaning theory (‘s’ in L 
means that p). 
 Lepore and Ludwig give an excellent example of a truth theory for a simple language 
(which they call Simple English) to show how Davidson’s truth theory/meaning theory proposal 
works.28  Since giving this example is so essential to showing Davidson’s success in the initial 
project, I will largely reproduce their example here.  I want it to be clear that this example is 
essentially not my own creative work.  I will, however, make a slight alteration.  Lepore and 
Ludwig’s Simple English is meant to be a different language from English, but it uses English 
expressions.  This can be slightly confusing, since it makes the theorems of the truth theory 
appear trivial.  So, in providing this example, my language will use words in French instead. 
 We will call the language for which we want to define truth “Simple French.”  I will 
follow Lepore and Ludwig in putting expressions in Simple French in a different typeface, so it 
is even easier to distinguish between our object language (Simple French) and our metalanguage 
                                                 
27
 Davidson, “Truth and Meaning,” 18. 
28
 Lepore and Ludwig, Donald Davidson, 66-74. 
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(English).  Simple French consists of two names, “Claude” and “Michel,” one untensed 
predicate, “est gentil,” and two logical operators, “pas,” and “et.”  Expressions in Simple 
French consist of finite strings of these symbols.  An atomic expression of Simple French 
consists of a name followed by a predicate: either “Claude est gentil,” or “Michel 
est gentil.”  Complex expression in Simple French are made by connecting atomic 
expressions according to the following two rules:  
(1) If x is an expression in Simple French, then its negation, “Pas:x” is an expression in 
Simple French (ex. “Pas:Claude est gentil”) 
(2) If x and y are expressions in Simple French, then their conjunction, “x et y” is an 
expression in Simple French (ex. “Claude est gentil et Michel est 
gentil”). 
 Now we need to stipulate the axioms for our truth theory.  The axioms I use here are 
going to draw on what I know these French words to actually mean in English.  This will play an 
important role in the discussion of what constraint needs to be put on the truth theory for it to 
work as a meaning theory, which we will come to below.  We will have two types of axioms: 
base axioms, for the referents of names and the truth conditions of atomic expressions, and 
recursive axioms, for the truth conditions of complex expressions.  For the purpose of this 
example, let “ref(x)” stand for “the referent of x” and “trueF” stand for “is true in Simple 
French.” 
Base Axioms 
(A1) Ref(Claude) is Claude. 
(A2) Ref(Michel) is  Michel. 
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(A3) For all names x, “x est gentil” is trueF if and only if x is nice.29 
Recursive Axioms 
(A4) For all expressions y, its negation “Pas:y” is trueF if and only if it is not the case that y 
is trueF. 
(A5) For all expressions y, z, their conjunction “y et z” is trueF if and only if y is trueF and z 
is trueF. 
 
 The first thing to point out about these axioms is that the recursive axioms determine the 
truth conditions of a complex expression based on the truth conditions of its parts.  Thus this 
theory is compositional – a promising sign.  We will now use these axioms to give a sample 
proof of a theorem in our truth theory for Simple French.  This theorem will specify, entirely in 
the metalanguage, under which conditions the expression is trueF.  In order to have our truth 
conditions entirely in the metalanguage, any expressions of Simple French and the predicate 
“trueF” cannot appear on the right side of the biconditional.  Therefore we must keep applying 
our axioms recursively until these are eliminated.  Once all traces of Simple French and “trueF” 
have been eliminated from the right hand side of the biconditional, we know we have reached 
our theorem, because we can no longer apply any axioms.   
 Let us take “Claude est gentil et Pas:Michel est gentil” as our 
expression.  The proof of its truth conditions goes as follows:30 
                                                 
29
 Since the predicate “est gentil” is untensed in Simple French, its metalanguage counterpart (“is nice”) must 
also be untensed.  So let us stipulate that x is nice if at some time t in x’s life, x has done or will do something nice. 
30
 For our proof, we will also need some inference rules in order to apply the axioms.  For this proof, we will need to 
specify two inference rules.  First, let an expression be universally quantified if all the variables in the expression are 
quantified by “for all.”  Now our rules: (1) Universal Instantiation: from any expression universally quantified over 
the variable x, we may infer the expression that replaces x with any other expression.  (2) Substitution: for any 
expression containing a name in Simple French, we may infer the expression that has replaced the name with its 
metalanguage referent. 
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(1) By A5, “Claude est gentil et Pas:Michel est gentil” is trueF if and 
only if “Claude est gentil” is trueF and “Pas:Michel est gentil” is trueF. 
(2) By A4, “Claude est gentil et Pas:Michel est gentil” is trueF if and 
only if “Claude est gentil” is trueF and it is not the case that “Michel est 
gentil” is trueF. 
(3) By two applications of A3, “Claude est gentil et Pas: Michel est 
gentil” is trueF if and only if “Claude” is nice and it is not the case that “Michel” is 
nice. 
(4) Finally, by A1 and A2, “Claude est gentil et Pas:Michel est gentil” 
is trueF if and only if Claude is nice and it is not the case that Michel is nice. 
 
 Now that we have the truth conditions of our expression, our question becomes: when 
can we be sure that we are justified in inferring to the meaning of our expression based on these 
proven truth conditions?  Tarski knew that in order for a truth definition such as the one 
proposed above to be adequate, the predicate “is true” as specified by the definition must apply 
to all and only the true sentences of the object language.  Tarki insightfully provided a criterion 
for determining the adequacy of the truth theory: a truth theory for a language has all and only 
the true sentences of that language as its extension if and only if the theorems of the theory 
include all sentences of the form “s is true if and only if p” where ‘s’ is replaced with a structural 
description of an expression in the object language and ‘p’ is replaced with a translation of that 
expression into the metalanguage.  This works because translation preserves meaning, and what 
an expression means, in relation to the world, determines that expression’s truth value.  So object 
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language and metalanguage expressions that are the same in meaning (are translations of each 
other) must also be the same in truth value.31 
 This leads directly into the constraint that must be put on a truth theory for it to give the 
meanings of expressions as well as their truth conditions.  How do we guarantee that, when the 
truth conditions proof is finished, the right side of the resulting theorem will be a translation of 
the left?  Since in proving the theorem, the only things we draw on are the content of the axioms, 
the right side will translate the left if the axioms provide metalanguage interpretations of the 
basic object language expressions – that is, if the axioms give the meanings of the object 
language expressions in the metalanguage.  Since we draw only on the content of the axioms in 
each step, if the axioms are interpretive, each step of the proof will preserve meaning as well.  So 
having interpretive axioms guarantees that the truth theory will be adequate, and thus that the 
right side of the theorem provides a translation of the object language expression on the left into 
the metalangugae.32 This is essential for using our truth theory as a meaning theory because it 
justifies the inference from a truth theory theorem (‘s’ is true if and only if p) to a meaning 
theory theorem (‘s’ means that p).33 
 We have not forgotten that the most important thing we are looking to satisfy with the use 
of the truth theory is the compositionality constraint.  Each step in the proof shows how the truth 
conditions of the parts of the expression contribute to the truth conditions of the whole.  The 
truth conditions of the parts are determined by the axioms, so if the axioms are interpretive, the 
process of the proof will also demonstrate how the meaning of the whole expression is built on 
the meanings of the parts, and how they are combined.  So it is in the proof that we see the 
compositionality. 
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 We can now put all this together and see Davidson’s vision for providing a solution to the 
initial project.  Let us call a truth theory whose axioms are interpretive an interpretive truth 
theory.  The constraint that needs to be put on a truth theory in order for it to work in service of a 
meaning theory is simply that the truth theory be interpretive.  Then a meaning theory for a 
language L can be said to consist of:  
(1) the axioms of an interpretive truth theory 
(2) the additional axiom that if “‘s’ is true in L if and only if p” is a theorem proven using 
only the axioms of the truth theory, then ‘s’ means that p. 
  
If we go back to our Simple French example, we can turn our truth theory into a meaning 
theory by stipulating that (A1)-(A5) are interpretive and adding the additional axiom:  
(A6) If “ ‘s’ is trueF if and only if p” is a theorem proven using only (A1)-(A5), then ‘s’ in 
Simple French means that p.   
If we reconsider our Simple French expression “Claude est gentil et Pas:Michel 
est gentil,” we can take the proof steps (1)-(4) from above, plus the additional premise: 
(5) the biconditional in step (4) is a theorem proven using only (A1)-(A5) 
and conclude by (A6) and (1)-(5) our first meaning theory theorem:  
(6) “Claude est gentil et Pas:Michel est gentil” in Simple French 
means that Claude is nice and it is not the case that Michel is nice.   
Further, steps (1)-(4) demonstrate how the meaning of this expression is made up from the 
meanings of its parts. 
 This concludes Davidson’s initial project.  I think his proposal that a properly constrained 
(i.e. interpretive) truth theory can be used as a compositional meaning theory is very successful, 
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as I hope to have shown above.  However, the reader is likely left unsatisfied with the fact that 
thus far we have simply stipulated that the truth theory is interpretive.  While this is an 
acceptable move given the aims of the initial project, it is disappointing to those who wish to 
know how one could come to understand a language in its entirety – including its basic 
expressions – given no initial information.  Davidson himself probably felt the same way, which 
is why his work on the extended project quickly eclipsed the work on the initial project.  What 
we have just shown is that if we stipulate that the axioms of a truth theory for a language are 
interpretive, then the truth theory works as a meaning theory for the language.  So the task at 
hand is to figure out how to construct the axioms of an interpretive truth theory that does not 
simply assume that the axioms are interpretive.  This is the task of Davidson’s extended project 
is intended to accomplish just this task.  In this part of the project, the question Davidson seeks to 
answer is how one could construct and confirm a truth theory for a completely foreign language 
in a way that would guarantee it to be interpretive. 
 
1.4 The Extended Project 
 The result of Davidson’s work on the extended project is his development of the 
procedure termed “radical interpretation.”  The thought is that the radical interpreter, who enters 
a community of speakers of a language entirely foreign to him, can come to understand this 
foreign language by constructing a truth theory for the language based solely on empirical 
evidence.  The radical interpreter, of course, can have no prior knowledge of what any of the 
speakers’ utterances mean, and thus cannot be assumed to know anything about the speakers’ 
beliefs.  So the only evidence the radical interpreter has available is the behavior of the speakers 
– primarily the acts of uttering and giving assent or dissent – and under what environmental 
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conditions these behaviors occur.  Davidson believes that based solely on this evidence, it is 
possible to confirm a truth theory for the language that is guaranteed to be interpretive. 
 The way the radical interpreter goes about this is by determining to the best of his ability 
under what conditions a speaker holds an expression true.34  The radical interpreter might do this 
by first observing that the speaker only utters the expression “x” when the set of environmental 
conditions Y obtain.  So, the next time Y obtains, the radical interpreter might ask the speaker, 
“x?” and see if the speaker assents or dissents to this inquiry.  If the speaker assents, the radical 
interpreter can make a tentative pairing between the expression “x” and the conditions Y – “For a 
speaker S, ‘x’ is held true if and only if Y.”  Lepore and Ludwig term these “hold-true” 
biconditionals “L-sentences.”35  If the speaker dissents, however, the radical interpreter knows 
that the set of conditions Y is either not sufficient for a speaker to hold “x” true, or there is 
something extra included in Y that negates the truth of “x.”  In this case, the radical interpreter 
should continue to refine the set of conditions to be paired with “x” by further observation and 
testing until he has seemed to determine the exact set of conditions under which a speaker of the 
language will assent to “x.” 
 Once the radical interpreter has several well-confirmed L-sentences in his arsenal, he can 
start constructing a tentative truth theory.  The idea is that the radical interpreter will use the 
content of the L-sentences he has empirically confirmed to infer target theorems of the truth 
theory.36  By taking them all together, the radical interpreter can start to look for patterns in the 
parts of an utterance and the conditions they are paired with to begin to suggest axioms giving 
the truth conditions of these parts.  For instance, the radical interpreter may observe that 
whenever an expression x is paired with another expression, the conditions under which a 
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speaker assents to the pair are the absence of the conditions under which the speaker would 
assent to the expression alone.  From this, the radical interpreter might hypothesize that x 
functions as a negation, and construct an axiom for x as such. 
 In order for the content of the L-sentences to be used as target theorems for the truth 
theory, two things need to be established about them.  First, a biconditional can only be a 
theorem of a truth theory if the predicate on the right hand side is “is true.”  So, the radical 
interpreter needs to be able to infer that the conditions under which an expression is held true are 
the same conditions under which the expression is true.  Then the radical interpreter can infer a 
“T-Form sentence”37 that is the same as the L-sentence, except in the T-Form sentence, “held 
true” is replaced with “is true.”  Second, the radical interpreter needs to be sure that these T-form 
sentences inferred on the basis of the L-sentences are interpretive.  Otherwise, any truth theory 
that generates these T-form sentences as theorems is not guaranteed to be an interpretive truth 
theory, which is necessary.  So, the radical interpreter needs to know that the conditions he is 
pairing expressions with give the meaning of the expression – the conditions capture the content 
of the expression. 
Davidson introduces his infamous “Principle of Charity” to accomplish this double task.  
What Davidson actually thinks the Principle of Charity includes is somewhat ambiguous, since 
he formulates differently at different times, sometimes in terms of the truth of a speaker’s beliefs, 
and sometimes in terms of agreement between a speaker’s beliefs.  Lepore and Ludwig offer an 
in-depth examination of the different formulations of Charity and argue for one in particular, 
giving reasons why the other interpretations fail.38  They further argue that Charity itself is not 
enough to justify the move from being held true to being true, and introduce a improved version, 
                                                 
37
 A bit of terminology – Lepore and Ludwig use “T-form sentence” to refer to any sentence of the form “‘s’ is true 
if and only if p.”  The term “T-sentence” is reserved for T-Form sentences that are interpretive. 
38
 See Ibid,, 182-196.  
 25 
which they call “Grace,” that they believe is sufficient.  Since Charity is not the focus of my 
project, I will not go into the details of this discussion, but rather simply present it in its strongest 
form.  This will include elements of Lepore and Ludwig’s “Grace,” but I will continue to use 
Davidson’s terminology, and call what is covered here “Charity.” 
 To see what we need Charity to accomplish, the first step is to observe that hold true 
attitudes result from two factors: what the speaker believes and what his expressions mean.39  
When a speaker has a belief, he will hold the expression that expresses the content of this belief 
to be true.  This is simply what it is to believe something.  The content of the expression is its 
meaning, so in this case, the meaning of the expression is the content of the belief.  A hold-true 
attitude with regard to an expression must depend, therefore, on both the speaker’s beliefs, and 
the meaning of the expression.  In order to use hold-true attitudes to isolate meaning, then, the 
radical interpreter needs a way to hold the speaker’s beliefs constant.   
The radical interpreter has to, in a way that will be made precise below, assume some of 
the speaker’s beliefs to be true.  If we allow belief to fluctuate, that is, if do not know whether a 
speaker’s beliefs are true or false, we are not justified in assuming that the hold-true conditions 
of an expression give the content of the expression.  For if the speaker’s belief is false, he is 
assenting to the expression under conditions that improperly capture the expression’s meaning.  
For example, if I falsely believe that there is a cup on my desk, and the radical interpreter asks 
me “there is a cup on your desk?” I will assent.  The radical interpreter will then record all the 
conditions of my assent, which will not include a cup being on the desk.  These conditions 
clearly do not capture the meaning of the expression.  Therefore, if it is possible that a speaker’s 
beliefs are false, the hold-true conditions of the expression expressing this belief cannot be 
trusted to capture meaning of the expression.  Further, and more straightforwardly, if it is 
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possible that the speaker’s beliefs are false, we are not justified in inferring a T-form sentence 
based on the L-sentence, since the fact that the expression is held true does not guarantee that the 
expression is true under these conditions. 
Therefore, in order for the radical interpreter to be able to move forward, he will have to 
make an assumption that some of the speaker’s beliefs are true.  This idea at first probably seems 
abhorrent to any philosopher, as it is so often the case that people’s beliefs are not actually true.  
It would indeed be foolish to assume all the beliefs of a given speaker are true.  However, if we 
limit the type of beliefs that are assumed to be true to a set that are quite likely to actually be 
true, then making this assumption will not be so offensive.  The set of beliefs suggests itself 
fairly readily if we consider what the radical interpreter is actually doing.  Since the radical 
interpreter has to pair expressions with the environmental conditions under which they are 
assented to, this task will be accomplished most easily for expressions that a speaker sometimes 
holds true and sometimes holds false in response to changes in the conditions of his 
environment.40  These expressions are the contents of beliefs that are highly context-sensitive, 
and usually about the actual conditions prompting them.  For example, these are expressions like 
“the cup is on the table,” “it is snowing right now,” “the lamp is on,” etc. 
Barring any significant oddities or abnormalities, it is highly likely that a speaker’s 
beliefs about these types of matters are true.  All things being equal – that is, the speaker is an 
average, sane human being with fully functioning perceptual apparatus, and nothing is being 
done to deliberately deceive the speaker – it is reasonable to assume that a speaker will have 
largely true beliefs of this type.  If this is right, then it is not so offensive to apply Charity to 
these beliefs, and assume for the purpose of interpretation that a speaker’s beliefs of this type are 
in fact true. 
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Now we can formally characterize Charity as consisting of the following assumptions:41   
(C1) A speaker holds true an expression s under a set of environmental conditions expressed 
by the sentence ‘p,’ because and only because he knows that x means that p, he or she 
believes that p, and knows that s is then true if and only if p.42 
(C2) The conditions that L-sentences identify as the conditions under which a speaker holds 
an expression true are also the prompting conditions of the belief that the expressions 
express.43 
(C3) A speaker’s beliefs prompted by conditions in his or her environment, by and large, are 
about these prompting conditions, and are true. 
 
 Does this characterization of Charity accomplish what we want it to?  Does it guarantee 
that the conditions under which a speaker holds an expression true are the conditions under 
which the expression is true (allows us to infer T-Form sentences from L-sentences), and that 
these conditions also give the content of the expression (guarantees that the inferred T-Form 
sentences will be interpretive)?  (C2) tells us that the conditions under which an expression is 
held true are the prompting conditions of the belief it expresses, and thus by (C3) give the 
content of the expression.  This is enough for interpretiveness.  (C3) also tells us that a speaker 
believes that p (an environmental prompted belief) if and only if p.  Then by (C1), the speaker 
holds true the expression s, which expresses the content of his or her belief that p, if and only if 
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p.  Therefore, by (C1) and (C3), the conditions under which the speaker holds an expression of 
this type true are also the conditions under which the expression is true.  So (C1)-(C3) have 
given us what we needed to move forward.44 
 The rest of the process of radical interpretation is as follows.45  Justified by Charity, the 
radical interpreter infers T-sentences (interpretive T-Form sentences) based on the empirically 
developed L-sentences.  He then uses these T-sentences as the target theorems of the truth theory, 
looking for structural patterns between parts of expressions and paired conditions that will allow 
the radical interpreter to suggest tentative axioms giving the truth conditions of these parts.  Once 
the radical interpreter has obtained several tentative axioms, he uses these axioms to derive new 
theorems – T-sentences other than the T-sentences he or she used to construct the tentative 
theory.  For example, if the radical interpreter uses the expressions “the cat is on the mat” and 
“the dog is on the couch” to construct the tentative truth theory, the new theorems he proves 
might give the truth conditions of “the cat is on the couch” and “the dog is on the mat.”  The 
radical interpreter takes these new T-sentences, which give the truth conditions of expressions for 
which he does not yet have an L-sentence, and tests them by checking whether the speakers 
assent or dissent to the expression in a pattern that would be predicted by the truth conditions 
given by the hypothesized theory.   
If the speakers assent and dissent entirely as predicted, the truth theory has been 
confirmed, and the work of the radical interpreter is done.  In the initially more plausible case 
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that the speakers assent and dissent not quite as predicted, the radical interpreter records the 
patterns of assent and dissent to these new expressions as further evidence, uses them to refine 
the tentative truth conditions, and constructs L-sentences for them based on this evidence.  He 
does with several new expressions, and then repeats the above procedure – inferring the 
corresponding T-sentences, and using these T-sentences as the truth theory’s target theorems, 
adds to and refines the tentative axioms.  Then the radical interpreter again derives new T-
sentences from the refined axioms, and again tests with speakers.  The radical interpreter repeats 
this procedure over and over until he has found axioms that yield T-sentences that predict the 
assent and dissent patterns of speakers to a very high degree of accuracy.  The truth theory has 
then been confirmed for the language, and can be used in a meaning theory as specified above. 
In this way, the radical interpreter comes to be able to discern the structure of the foreign 
language, and the meanings of its most basic expressions, theoretically enabling the 
understanding of any expression in the language, thus accomplishing the goal of the extended 
project.  We have now seen Davidson’s proposal for a meaning theory in full.  I find it to be an 
extremely impressive proposal.  However, given the complicated nature of the subject matter it is 
dealing with, and the breadth of the proposal, it is naturally controversial in many aspects.  In 
what follows, I aim to contribute to the discussion about the success of Davidson’s proposal by 
looking at one particular threat to the success of radical interpretation.
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Chapter 2 
The Ambiguity Problem and the Triangulation-Based Solution 
 
 This chapter will focus on the issue that arises during radical interpretation that I will be 
considering – the ambiguity problem.  As a foundation for understanding the ambiguity problem, 
we need to first take a brief look at the phenomenon of underdetermination.  I will then proceed 
to spell out the ambiguity that arises, and why it is an issue for radical interpretation.  I will then 
argue that Davidson’s triangulation can provide a solution to this problem. 
 
2.1 Underdetermination 
 A set of evidence underdetermines a theory confirmed on the basis of this evidence if 
multiple, incompatible theories can be confirmed equally well by the evidence.46  Let T1 and T2 
be two theories accounting for a body of evidence E.  We will stipulate that T1 and T2 are 
incompatible.  E underdetermines T1 if T2 accounts for E equally as well as T1 does, and vice 
versa.  Note of course that underdetermination is always relative to a specified body of 
evidence.47  T1 and T2 may be underdetermined in relation to E, but when further evidence E' is 
incorporated, one theory may be shown to be more adequate than the other.  For instance, T1 may 
account for E' while T2 does not.  In this case, although the two theories are underdetermined 
relative to E, they are not underdetermined relative to E' – T1 has been shown to be more 
adequate than T2 when E' is our body of evidence. 
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 Radical interpretation is a procedure for constructing an interpretive truth theory that 
accounts for the behavioral assent/dissent patterns exhibited by speakers of a language.  If 
multiple, incompatible truth theories can account for the radical interpreter’s evidence equally 
well, by the above reasoning, this would suggest that radical interpretation fails.  This is 
ultimately the point ambiguity problem seeks to show – it claims that two incompatible truth 
theories can be confirmed using the process of radical interpretation and based on the radical 
interpreter’s evidence.  The radical interpreter’s evidence thus underdetermines any truth theory.  
If this is the case, any truth theory confirmed by radical interpretation cannot be guaranteed to be 
interpretive, and therefore radical interpretation fails to yield a meaning theory for a language. 
 
2.2 The Ambiguity Problem 
 The ambiguity problem arises when constructing our L-sentences.  Recall from Chapter 1 
that L-sentences correlate an utterance with the environmental conditions under which it is held 
true.  Further, in order for the interpreter to be able to infer a T-sentence (a sentence that gives 
the interpretive truth conditions of an utterance), from an L-sentence, we need to be confident 
that the belief expressed by the utterance is caused by and about these conditions.  When 
discussing Charity, I suggested that this is plausibly the case when considering beliefs about our 
environment. 
 However, it is not the case that there is only one set of environmental conditions that 
might be paired with an utterance.  There is an ambiguity about what conditions are relevant to 
an utterance.  There are actually at least two types of conditions that we can identify: distal 
stimuli, which are actual objects and events in the world, and proximal stimuli, which are 
patterns of stimulation the speaker undergoes in the presence of distal stimuli.  Which set of 
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stimuli constitutes the relevant cause?  Since the distal stimuli and the proximal stimuli occur at 
just the same times, any correlation of an utterance with the distal stimuli is equally a correlation 
of the utterance with the proximal stimuli.  Thus the radical interpreter can actually confirm two 
sets of L-sentences from the evidence: one that specifies the hold-true conditions of an utterance 
as the distal stimuli, and one set that specifies the hold-true conditions of an utterance as the 
proximal stimuli. 
 This is an issue, because if we can equally confirm two incompatible sets of L-sentences, 
we are going to be left with the underdetermination of theory by the evidence.  By applying 
Charity to each set of L-sentences, we can obtain two sets of T-sentences.  From these two sets of 
T-sentences, we can project to two different truth theories for the speaker’s language.  These 
truth theories will have differing axioms since they are projected from different sets of T-
sentences.  Since their axioms differ, the theorems of these truth theories will differ as well.  
Thus we will be left with two sets of theorems that give different truth conditions for the same 
utterance.  Therefore the two truth theories are incompatible.  Since we can equally confirm two 
incompatible theories, both theories are underdetermined by the evidence.   
 If this is right, the underdetermination of these two theories would show that radical 
interpretation is unsuccessful.  For since we can equally come to two sets of truth conditions, we 
cannot be sure that either one or the other set is interpretive.  Therefore, we are not justified in 
inferring meaning theorems from the theorems of either truth theory.  Radical interpretation, 
then, has failed to give us a meaning theory for the language of our speaker. 
 A successful solution to the ambiguity problem would have to give us some way to 
determine the relevant stimuli – distal or proximal – in the environmental conditions correlated 
with an utterance.  If we can come up with some way of saying for certain what the relevant 
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cause is, one of the sets of L-sentences will no longer be compatible with the evidence.  This 
would eliminate the underdetermination of theory by evidence, and bolster the case that radical 
interpretation can be successful in producing a meaning theory for a language. 
 
2.3 Davidson’s Triangulation Thesis 
 Davidson is well aware of problem of ambiguity between the distal and proximal stimuli.  
Davidson asserts that if it were possible for a creature to exist without having ever engaged in 
communication, and we were to observe this creature responding to its environment, no matter 
how complex these responses were, they could never be taken to demonstrate that the creature is 
reacting to or thinking about events “a certain distance away [distal stimuli] rather than, say, on 
its skin [proximal stimuli].”48  This is precisely because of the same ambiguity noted above – the 
creature’s responses could equally be correlated with distal and proximal events.  Thus we 
cannot tell which type of stimulus the creature is responding to.  Further, if we were to take the 
creature’s responses as indicative of the contents of its thoughts, we would have no way to tell 
what type of stimulus constitutes these contents, based on the observed correlations of response 
and conditions of response. 
 By “thoughts,” Davidson means the intentional states, or propositional attitudes, of a 
creature – beliefs, desires, and so on.[citation]  Intentional states, in order to be intentional, must be 
directed, or about something.49  So if we in principle are unable to specify what the contents of 
the creature’s thoughts are, this would mean that the creature does not have thoughts at all, in the 
sense that the creature does not have true intentional states.  It would be natural to object at this 
point that while we cannot determine what the creature’s thoughts are about from the third 
                                                 
48
 Donald Davidson, “The Conditions of Thought,” Le Cahier 7 (April, 1989): 169. 
49
 Ibid., 165. 
 34 
person perspective, this does not prevent the creature itself from knowing what its own thoughts 
are about, from the first person perspective.  If this were the case, the creature could be said to 
have thoughts even if the contents were indeterminate from the standpoint of an observer.  
However, this would require the creature to be able to have the concept of an object – the 
stimulus he is responding to – independent of any communication.  Davidson thinks this is 
impossible.50 
 Davidson thinks a solitary speaker cannot have the concept of an object independent of 
all communication for the following reasons.  In order to have the concept of an object, one must 
be able to understand that the concept can be misapplied.51  For example, a creature could not 
believe it sees a giraffe if it did not know “that some things are correctly identified as giraffes 
and some things are not.”52  If a creature does not understand this, it cannot be said to have the 
concept of a giraffe, because it does not understand giraffes to be things that exist independently 
of its perceptions of them.  But if this were so, then the creature’s thoughts would not actually be 
about actual giraffes at all.  The creature’s thoughts that seem to be about giraffes would actually 
have as their content whatever seems to the creature to be a giraffe.  But this could be anything at 
all.  So, if a creature does not have the concept of an object – understanding that the concept can 
be misapplied – then any of the creature’s thoughts could have anything as its content, which is 
to say that it would have no determinate content. 
 How does one acquire this understanding of the potential for misapplication?  Davidson 
believes it is only through communication with another creature.  For in order to understand that 
one’s concepts can be misapplied, one has to have the experience of one’s responses not 
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matching up with what is actually the case.  One cannot encounter this alone, because there is no 
source of comparison – one would not respond to an event in a certain way if one did not think 
that it was the correct response.  One will continue to do this unless one observes another 
creature that has responded to the same event in a different way.  Only then does understanding 
of the possibility of error enter the picture.  And it is only with an understanding of the 
possibility of error that an understanding of an inter-subjective world can enter the picture.  
 This leads us nicely into describing the actual triangle that constitutes “triangulation.”  
The three points of the triangle are two speakers and an object or event in the world.  Each 
speaker is simultaneously interacting with the world and with the other speaker.53  Each speaker 
recognizes what appear to be similarities in the world, and correspondingly responds to the world 
in similar ways.  Each speaker also recognizes similarities in the responses of the other speaker, 
in correlation to events in the world.  In short, “each creature learns to correlate the reactions of 
the other with changes or objects in the world to which it also reacts.”54 
 How can this triangle be said to determine the contents of thoughts?  First off, engaging 
in this type of triangulation fixes the cause of the responses.  Consider the case of a speaker 
responding to the presence of a table by uttering the word “table.”  For this single speaker, both 
actual tables, as well as patterns of stimulation caused by tables are will be similar events that are 
correlated to the similar response of the utterance of “table.”  Again, this is the ambiguity issue 
we are ultimately concerned with.   
 However, say we introduce another speaker into the situation, who also responds to the 
presence of tables by uttering “table.”  Suppose both speakers recognize that their own responses 
and the responses of the other speaker are the same.  This causes the speakers to hypothesize that 
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they are reacting to the same object.  The only way to know this is to try to communicate.  If they 
are successfully in communication about the object they both have in mind, then it can be said 
that this object is a shared cause of their responses.  Whatever this shared cause is, then, must be 
able to account for the responses of both speakers.  This rules out the proximal stimuli as what 
the speakers are thinking about.  Proximal stimuli are by definition not shared and so the 
proximal stimuli experienced by either speaker cannot account for the responses of both 
speakers.  Since they have communicated, their thoughts have a shared object, and thus the distal 
stimuli are the only candidates for the cause, because they are the only stimuli that are shared 
between speakers. 
 Through the process of triangulating, then, speakers come to a determinate object to 
which they are responding.  And then if we take their responses as indicative of the contents of 
their thoughts, we are left with the distal stimuli as the determinate contents of their thoughts. 
 Secondly,55 by participating in this triangle, a speaker can obtain the concept of an object.  
This is because by locating the common cause in the world, the two speakers together identify 
what that cause is as the intersection of their responses.56  Recognizing the existence of a triangle 
with the object in question as the intersection of similar responses of two speakers allows one to 
understand the potential for error – in some situation, the triangle could break down.  In that 
case, one of the speakers is not responding in the appropriate way.  Thus, identifying the cause as 
the intersection of the responses is sufficient for obtaining the concept of an object. 
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 One point of clarification – the phrase “concept of an object” might be a bit ambiguous.  
On some views of concepts, one can be said to have the concept “table,” for example, if one is 
simply capable of using the term table to refer to things.  This is not the “concept of an object” 
that I am meaning to use here.  For it seems that one can have this type of concept without 
communication – simply by learning to correlate responses with environmental events.  This type 
of concept is not sufficient for knowing that one’s concepts can be misapplied, however.  What is 
needed to know that one’s concepts can be misapplied is a second-order concept of sorts.  This 
second-order concept is a concept of the first concept “table” – it tells me propositional 
information about what a table is and thus under what conditions “table” is applied appropriately 
and not appropriately.  And it is this second-order concept that we cannot acquire without 
communication.  This seems clear if we consider a situation, as Davidson often does, in which a 
child is learning a new word.57  When a child acquires the ability the ability to use the world 
“table,” he has the first order concept.  But the child might wildly misuse table initially (children 
often under or over apply terms as they learn language).  The child learns the conditions under 
which “table” can be asserted through being corrected or rewarded by other speakers.  Through 
this process of trial and error, the child slowly acquires the concept of what a table is, and thus 
learns that the concept can be misapplied. 
 We have now gone through the details of triangulation in what has hopefully been an 
adequately clear manner.  In summary, the argument from triangulation is this:58 
(T1) A creature’s thoughts (propositional attitudes) have determinate objects only if it 
engages as a speaker in triangulation with another speaker in communication about a 
common object of thought. 
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(T2) Nothing can have propositional attitudes unless there can be determinate contents of 
these attitudes. 
(T3) Therefore, nothing can have thoughts unless it engages as a speaker in triangulation 
with another speaker. 
The argument for premise (T1) is that “thoughts” can only have determinate content if the 
creature has the concept of an object, and we can discern the relevant object (discerning between 
the distal and proximal stimuli).  Triangulation is required for both of these tasks.  Therefore 
triangulation is required to give “thoughts” determinate content. 
 
2.4 Triangulation as a Response to the Ambiguity Problem 
 Triangulation serves as a response to the ambiguity problem by placing a constraint on 
what a creature can be taken to have in mind when it communicates (utters).59  In order for 
interpretation of a creature’s sounds to work at all, it is obviously necessary that the creature is 
interpretable – its sounds must be meaningful.  This is to say that it is necessary that the creature 
has thoughts – beliefs, desires, etc., the contents of which its utterances express.  Thus by 
engaging in radical interpretation, we are forced to assume that our subjects of interpretation are 
creatures who have thoughts (if they did not, there would be no content in their expressions to 
interpret).  If what has just been said about triangulation is correct, it is then also necessary that 
we treat our subjects of interpretation as creatures who have triangulated, since engaging in 
triangulation is necessary for the determination of thought. 
 As necessarily treating our subjects as creatures who have thoughts, we are 
acknowledging that there is a determinate content of their thoughts, and thus a determinate 
content of their utterances that express these thoughts.  As necessarily treating our subjects as 
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creatures who have triangulated, the possibilities for the content of their thoughts and utterances 
are constrained to the distal stimuli, since this is what triangulation determines as the content of 
thoughts. 
 Therefore, if triangulation is indeed necessary for thought, it eliminates the ambiguity 
problem and the resultant underdetermination.  For by constraining the possible content of our 
subject’s thoughts and utterances to the distal stimuli, the set of L-sentences that correlates 
utterances with their proximal stimuli is no longer confirmed by the evidence.  As a result, we 
are left with only one set of L-sentences that is compatible with the evidence, and are thus no 
longer at risk for underdetermination due to the proximal/distal contrast. 
 
2.5 An Additional Comment on Triangulation 
 Up to this point, I have taken Davidson’s proposals about meaning to be these: knowing 
what an expression means is the same as understanding that expression, and since knowing the 
truth conditions of an expression is sufficient for understanding the expression, truth conditions 
can be said to “give the meaning” of an expression.  With triangulation now in the picture, 
another piece of Davidson’s ideas about meaning and thought can come more into focus. 
 I think Davidson develops his notion of what meaning is in his later, triangulation-related 
work by suggesting that an expression means what it is that a speaker intends to be understood 
by his use of the expression.60  If we combine this notion with Davidson’s triangulation thesis – 
that the meanings of expressions become determinate through triangulating – this implies that 
one cannot mean something that, in principle, cannot come to be understood by another speaker.  
One might also note this has the further implication that there can be no private languages.61  
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This aspect of Davidson’s view, or what I take to be an aspect of his view at least, will play a 
role in how I respond to some of the objections or problems for triangulation that I will introduce 
in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 
Defending Triangulation 
 
 This chapter ultimately seeks to add to the argument that triangulation solves the 
ambiguity problem by defending triangulation against some objections that have been raised or 
could be raised against it.  If it can be shown, for instance, that triangulation is not actually 
necessary for thought, or that it fails to accomplish what it purports to, triangulation would not be 
a viable line of response, and thus it would fail to solve the ambiguity problem.  There exists a 
multitude of objections to triangulation, and so it would be impossible for me to confront every 
single objection in this paper.  The objections I consider are related in that they all mainly seek to 
show that triangulation is not sufficient to determine what expressions mean.  They will include 
an objection from Cathrine Talmage, a related objection one might make that is derived from 
Quine’s “gavagai” case, and an objection from Lepore and Ludwig. 
 
3.1 Talmage’s Objection 
 Talmage’s claim is that triangulating does not actually fix the contents of thoughts, and 
thus the meanings of the utterances that express these thoughts, as it purports to do.  If 
triangulating cannot actually give thoughts determinate content, then the argument (T1)-(T3) 
from section 2.3 is unsound because premise (T1) is false.  We will have then failed to establish 
that triangulating is necessary for thought, which is essential to triangulation serving as a 
solution to our ambiguity problem for radical interpretation. 
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 Talmage’s argument is this:62 She asks us to consider a person uttering the word “table.”  
We are asked to suppose that this person is able to conceive of the stimulus of his utterance of 
“table” as an object in the world, and Talmage even is willing to grant that the person has 
acquired this ability by interacting linguistically with another person on a previous occasion.  
Granting all this, it is possible, Talmage argues, that the person conceives of the stimulus of his 
utterance of “table” as an object, but not as a table.  He could, for instance, conceive of the 
stimulus as “a horizontal board with four supporting legs.”63  If this is so, it is clear that this 
person’s utterances of “table” have a meaning – their meaning is the content of the person’s 
thought, which is a horizontal board with four legs.  Further, it would be incorrect to say that the 
person’s utterances of “table” mean table, since the person would not apply the word to tables 
with more or less than four legs, for instance. 
 Now suppose there is a second person, let him be called B, who means table when he 
utters “table.”  The issue is that B could triangulate with the first person, call him A, in the 
presence of a four legged table, and come to the incorrect interpretation of A’s utterances of 
“table.”  In triangulating, A and B would locate the common cause of their similar utterances of 
“table” as the present four-legged table.  This triangulation would thus posit the contents of both 
A’s and B’s thoughts as the same.  But the contents of A’s and B’s thoughts are not the same – 
the content of A’s thought is a four-legged horizontal board, while the content of B’s thought is a 
table.  This shows, according to Talmage, that triangulation fails to actually determine the 
contents of thoughts, and thus also the meanings of utterances, since the way it purports to 
“determine” them can determine them wrongly. 
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 What Talmage says would be true, I think, if triangulation was meant to be a unitary 
phenomenon.  However, I think this is a mistaken understanding of how triangulation actually 
occurs.  My understanding of triangulation is that it is truly a process – speakers are meant to 
correlate their own responses with repeated occurrences of an event in the environment and with 
the repeated responses of another speaker.  Without the event occurring multiple times, one 
cannot possibly justify a correlation.  All that one could justify would be the statement that at one 
point in time, event E occurred in conjunction with response R.  What we need in order to 
correlate event E and response R is multiple observations of E occurring in conjunction with R. 
 If this is right, Talmage’s objection carries no weight.  For then it could not be the case 
that full-fledged triangulation would result in determining the contents of A’s and B’s thoughts 
as the same, when they are not.  While initially it may appear that A and B mean the same thing 
by “table” as a triangle begins to emerge so long as they only jointly encounter four-legged 
tables, as soon as A and B are both in the presence of a non-four-legged table, they will realize 
that their responses are no longer similar – A does not respond by uttering “table” while B does.  
The emerging triangle thus breaks down, and it is clear that the meanings of their respective 
utterances of “table,” and thus the contents of their thoughts, are different. 
 Triangulation, I think, must be conceived of as this “honing in” on the common cause, 
because Talmage is quite right that triangulation fails to determine a definitive common cause as 
a unitary phenomenon – as one interaction.  I cannot imagine that Davidson would have made 
this mistake.  However, if Davidson did intend triangulation to be a unitary phenomenon, my 
response still works.  In this case, I would frame my response not as explaining how Talmage’s 
objection misrepresents the actual process of triangulation, but rather as a reformulation of 
triangulation in order to overcome the issue Talmage points out.  No matter what, Talmage’s 
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objection either becomes irrelevant, or able to be accommodated by strengthening the position 
triangulation represents. 
 
3.2 Quine’s “Gavagai” Example 
 In a famous thought experiment, Quine asks us to imagine an interpreter trying to 
understand what a foreign speaker means by the expression “gavagai.”  The interpreter has 
observed that the speaker assents to “gavagai?” if and only if the speaker is aware of the 
presence of a rabbit.  So it seems natural to suggest that “gavagai” means rabbit.  Quine, 
however, makes the claim that this is unwarranted.64  The speaker could mean something like 
“undetatched rabbit parts” by “gavagai” and we would have no way to tell, since undetatched 
rabbit parts are present just in case a rabbit is present. 
 While Quine does not employ this thought experiment as an objection to triangulation, 
the ambiguity between rabbit and undetatched rabbit parts could be seen as a special, trickier 
case of the situation Talmage suggests.  My response to Talmage hinged on the fact that the 
differences between meaning horizontal board with four legs by “table” and meaning table by 
“table” would become manifest in the usage of these terms.  If confronted with a three-legged 
table, one speaker would assent to “table?” while the other would not.  However, in the gavagai 
case, the difference in meaning would apparently never become apparent in the usage of the 
term.  Whereas a three-legged table serves as a test case for whether a speaker means table or 
horizontal board with four legs by “table,” it seems that there is no test case that would reveal 
whether a speaker means rabbit or undetached rabbit parts by “gavagai.” 
 In trying to see how one might deal with this issue, the question that comes to mind is: do 
“undetatched rabbit parts” and “rabbit” really mean something different?  Of course the words 
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are different, but that does not stop the expressions from meaning the same thing.  If they do not 
mean the same thing, it seems like in principle there ought to be some possible test case that 
would reveal this difference.  Since what an expression means ultimately is, for Davidson, what a 
speaker can intend to be understood by it,65 meaning has to be public.  So if the meanings of 
these two expressions are different, it seems to me that this difference must, in principle, be 
publically accessible. 
 If there is no possible case that shows these expressions to differ in meaning, I would 
assert that they are the same in meaning.  For if there is no possible way that speaker could come 
to realize a difference in the usage of the two expressions, another speaker cannot intend 
something different to be understood by each expression. 
 Back to the original question – do “undetached rabbit parts” and “rabbit” mean 
something different?  This is, I think, a matter of intuition.  But in all cases, I think the result is 
unharmful for triangulation.  It seems that “undetached rabbit parts” could also apply to a thing 
made up of all rabbit parts, but not in the typical organization that we find in a rabbit.  For 
instance, one ear might be attached to the stomach, and one foot coming out the back, with the 
tail on the neck, and so on.  It seems to me that this object is certainly undetached rabbit parts.  
The question is whether this is also a rabbit.  Some might have the intuition that this thing is not 
a rabbit, while others might have the intuition that while it is certainly an atypical rabbit, and 
likely a rabbit in which something has gone horribly, horribly wrong, it is a rabbit nonetheless. 
 As I said above, I find neither case problematic.  In the first case, the intuition that this 
odd rabbit-thing is not a rabbit gives us our test case that would reveal the difference in meaning 
between “rabbit” and “undetached rabbit parts.”  In this case, triangulation in principle would 
reveal the correct interpretation of “gavagai” depending on whether the speaker applies 
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“gavagai” to the weird rabbit-thing or not.  In the second case, since there is no test case that 
would show a difference in use between “rabbit” and “undetached rabbit parts,” I conclude based 
on my comments above that the two expressions have the same meaning.  Thus in this case 
interpreting “gavagai” as rabbit or as undetached rabbit parts amounts to the same thing.  The 
words may be different, but the meaning, or expressed content, remains the same. 
   
3.3 Lepore and Ludwig’s Objection 
 Finally, we come to Lepore and Ludwig’s objection.  They offer us the following thought 
experiment:66 Lepore and Ludwig ask us to imagine a being who is equally capable of perceiving 
events in the environment and events that occur on the sensory surfaces of a speaker, A.  This 
being can shift its attention effortlessly between these two types of events.  Thus, if A were to 
engage in triangulation with this being, the being would have a choice about what to treat as the 
common cause – the distal event or the proximal event.  There is this choice because, in this 
case, both the distal event and the proximal event are shared by the two triangulators. 
 The result of this, Lepore and Ludwig argue, is that if the contents of thought are 
determined by triangulation, we would then be forced to conclude that the content of A’s 
thoughts changes whenever the other being shifts his attention from proximal to distal, or vice 
versa.  This is absurd – how could the content of A’s thoughts be changing without A’s 
knowledge?  It seems much more reasonable to say, contra the result of triangulation, that A’s 
expressions have a constant meaning, no matter what the alien chooses to attend to at any given 
time.  If we hold it to be true that the content of A’s thoughts is constant, then triangulation has 
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determined the contents of A’s thoughts wrongly.  Triangulation thus cannot be sufficient for 
determining thoughts. 
 I believe this objection can be resolved.  First, though, let us be clear about what would 
have to happen for the objection to have weight.  Suppose that A and the “special being,” (I will 
call it the “alien” from now on) are in the presence of a table and each respond by uttering 
“table.”  If the alien chose to pay attention only to actual objects, we would obviously have no 
problem.  If the alien chose to pay attention only to A’s sensory surfaces, then it would locate the 
common cause of the utterances as A’s undergoing a certain set of stimulations, say X, and thus 
triangulation would supposedly determine A’s undergoing stimulation set X as the content of the 
alien’s expression “table.”  That is to say, when the alien says “table,” it means that A is 
undergoing stimulation set X.   
 If this is truly what the alien means, it would be easy to come up with a test case to 
discover this.  All we would need to do is devise a situation in which the alien was in the 
presence of a table, but A was not undergoing stimulation set X, and see whether the alien 
assents to “table?” or not.  If the alien means by “table” that A is undergoing stimulation set X, it 
will have to dissent in this test case.  If we take it that A still means table by “table,” then this 
case is the same as the Talmage case.  As in my response to Talmage’s objection, continued 
triangulation can in principle make the difference in meaning between the alien and A become 
salient. 
 So, as we probably understood from the thought experiment itself, in order to make the 
alien problematic, we have to suppose that the alien is (deliberately?) inconsistent in its use of 
“table.”  Again, there are two types of inconsistency the alien might engage in.  The first type is 
that the alien does not direct its attention in a way such that it will ever employ the word “table” 
 48 
in a consistent fashion.  This means that sometimes the alien will assent to “table?” in the 
presence of a table, but sometimes it will not (in this case, it would be paying attention to the 
sensory stimulations of A, who would happen to not be currently receiving table-stimulations).  
Sometimes the alien will assent to “table?” when A is undergoing stimulation set X, and 
sometimes not (in this case, A would be in the presence of a table, and thus undergoing 
stimulation set X, while the alien would not be in the presence of a table, but choosing to pay 
attention to actual objects and not A’s stimulations).  The same idea holds for any other speaker 
the alien might encounter. 
 My first claim is that it is impossible to triangulate with the alien if it engages in this first 
type of inconsistency, and thus the alien’s utterance of “table” in this case is not meaningful.  
Since triangulation requires, on the part of both speakers, recognition of a pattern in the 
responses of the other speaker, if no such pattern is present in the alien’s utterances of “table,” no 
triangulation will take place, and its utterance will not be given meaning. 
 This claim can be argued for in another way as well.  As mentioned above, Davidson 
advances the view that meaning itself consists in what a speaker intends to be understood by the 
use of an expression.  So the question is: can the alien reasonably intend something to be 
understood by its utterances of “table”?  I think the answer has to be “no.”  What the alien would 
intend to be understood by “table” would change case by case.  In ambiguous cases where there 
is both a speaker and a table present, there is no way for the speaker to know whether the alien 
intends table or that the speaker is undergoing a certain set of stimulations to be understood by 
its utterance of “table.”  Usually this is fixed by triangulation.  However, since the alien’s 
utterances of “table” in this case are distinctly unpatterned, there is no way a speaker could ever 
come to know what it is the alien is intending to be understood – the speaker could never form a 
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correlation between the alien’s utterance of “table,” and some conditions of its truth.  Thus the 
alien’s utterances of “table” are completely useless in communication, which is another way of 
saying, I think, that they are simply not meaningful. 
 I now come to the second type of inconsistency the alien might engage in.  This second 
type of inconsistency is that the alien shifts its attention so that it will always assent to “table?” in 
the presence of a table.  This would involve always paying attention to tables when A (or some 
other potential speaker) is not undergoing stimulation set X, but having a choice of what to pay 
attention to when a table is present and A is being so stimulated.  It seems to me that we can 
solve the second case by introducing a third speaker, B, to engage in triangulation with A and the 
alien.  While many example cases of triangulation include only two participants, there is actually 
no limit on the number of speakers who might triangulate at a certain time.  Since A and B 
cannot pay attention to each other’s sensory surfaces, the only candidate for a common cause in 
this case is the actual table. 
 Again, we might look at this case from the perspective of what the alien could reasonably 
intend to be understood by its utterance in this situation as well.  The alien knows when it is 
switching its attention, but A and B do not.  So even if the alien happens to be paying attention to 
A’s sensory stimulations, since there is in principle no way for A to know this, the alien cannot 
intend for A to understand that it means “you are undergoing stimulation set X” by its utterance 
of “table,” since the utterance is equally correlated with the presence of tables.  One might even 
say it is more strongly correlated with the presence of tables, since in this case, the alien will 
assent to “table?” even when A is not being stimulated. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 With the above response I have offered to Lepore and Ludwig, I conclude my work for 
the present paper.  My intent was to argue that triangulation provides a solution to the ambiguity 
problem.  As I mentioned previously, since there are more objections to triangulation out there, I 
cannot conclude that I have definitively shown that triangulation is a solution.  However, I 
believe that I have contributed to the case.  By doing so, I have also provided an argument for the 
success of radical interpretation.  Since the ambiguity problem was a threat to this success, by 
arguing that it can be solved, I am also making an argument that radical interpretation can be 
successful. 
 Davidson’s ideas about things like language, thought, meaning, truth, reality, and the 
connections between these things, are intricate and dense.  I am certain there is more to 
Davidson’s views on these matters than I was able to reproduce here.  However, I do hope that I 
have been able to shed some light on Davidson’s semantics with the exposition I have offered of 
his views, and with my discussion of the ambiguity problem and triangulation.  The major 
proposals Davidson makes that were covered in this paper might be summarized as follows.  
First, a truth conditions are sufficient for understanding, and thus can be said to give what an 
expression means.  Second, an interpretive truth theory can also work as a meaning theory 
because it enables the understanding of any expression in a given language, and it does this in 
such a way as to exhibit the compositionality of meaning.  Third, based on purely behavioral 
evidence, an interpreter can construct and confirm a truth theory for a language that is guaranteed 
to be interpretive.  Fourth, triangulation, or communication with another speaker about similar 
responses to similar events, is necessary for a creature to have the concept of an object and to 
make the contents of its thoughts determinate.  Triangulation is thus a precondition for creatures 
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to be speakers – for their sounds to have content, or to be meaningful.  Fifth, meaning must 
therefore be in principle public – if a speaker cannot in principle come to understand an 
expression, the expression cannot be meaningful.  And finally, sixth, meaning consists in what a 
speaker intends to be understood by an expression.
 52 
References 
 
Davidson, Donald.  “Radical Interpretation.”  In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, by 
Donald Davidson, 125-140.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
Davidson, Donald.  “Rational Animals.”  In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, by Donald 
Davidson, 95-106.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001 
Davidson, Donald.  “The Conditions of Thought.”  Le Cahier, no. 7 (April, 1989): 165-171. 
Davidson, Donald.  “The Emergence of Thought.”  Erkenntnis 51, no. 1 (1999): 7-17. 
Davidson, Donald.  “Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages.”  In Inquires into Truth 
and Interpretation, by Donald Davidson, 3-16.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
Davidson, Donald.  “The Second Person.”  In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, by Donald 
Davidson, 107-122.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. 
Davidson, Donald.  “True to the Facts.”  In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, by Donald 
Davidson, 37-54.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
Davidson, Donald.  “Truth and Meaning.”  In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, by Donald 
Davidson, 17-36.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
Lepore, Ernie and Kirk Ludwig.  Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Montminy, Martin.  “Triangulation, Objectivity and the Ambiguity Problem.”  Crítica: Revista 
Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 35, no. 105 (December, 2003): 25-48. 
Orenstein, Alex.  W.V. Quine.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
Talmage, Catherine.  “Meaning and Triangulation.”  Linguistics and Philosophy 20, no. 2 (April, 
1997): 139-145. 
 53 
Verheggen, Claudine.  “Triangulating with Davidson.”  The Philosophical Quarterly 57, no. 226 
(January, 2007): 96-103.  
